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Abstract 
 
A common Eurobond making each participating issuer liable only for its own 
share could be agreed upon by the Member States with the lowest credit risk 
premia: Finland, France and Germany. However, the efficiency gains from this 
weak form of cooperation in terms of market integration and liquidity would be 
limited if not offset by the higher costs of an inflexible debt management. To 
reap the liquidity benefits of a unified market, the Eurobonds should be issued 
by all euro-area Member States or by an EU Institution. But only a common 
bond jointly guaranteed by all euro-area Member States could reach the “safe-
haven” status and the size needed to compete with the US Treasury market. 
The mutualisation of credit risks faces however strong political opposition, 
because of fears of relaxed fiscal discipline and inequitable sharing of its 
benefits and costs. Although solutions to these problems can be found, more 
evidence is needed on the benefits and costs of a common Eurobond to convince 
potential issuers. This paper makes a first step in this direction.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Notwithstanding the important steps taken towards market integration and greater 
efficiency, euro-area government bond markets remain fragmented as witnessed by 
persistent and, more recently, widening interest-rate differentials. This has led economists 
to reconsider the possibility of a European government bond jointly issued by euro-area 
Member States.1  While the timing of the new proposals reflects the pressures on weaker 
and/or smaller sovereign issuers who have found their funding costs increase as a result of 
the US financial and euro-area crises, the potential benefits from a common issuance 
program are known since the Giovannini Group Report (2000). A common Eurobond is a 
strong form of debt management cooperation with the potential of promoting further 
market integration, greater liquidity and lower borrowing costs. New proposals also contend 
that a common Eurobond would satisfy the global demand for a risk-free asset and better 
compete with US Treasuries for the global financial flows in search of a “safe-haven”, 
thereby strengthening the use of the euro as a reserve currency. The argument that 
Eurobonds could provide insurance and continued market access to weaker Member States 
during crises is instead rarely made, but Eurobonds could reduce exposure to crisis 
transmission from contagion and interdependence. In this paper, we first investigate the 
determinants of interest-rate differentials between euro-area Member States and between 
US and Germany in order to provide the relevant stylized facts needed to evaluate the 
rationale for a common Eurobond. Then, we discuss the benefits and the costs of three 
possible types of Eurobonds that encompass the various proposals. Finally, we consider the 
legal obstacles and the political opposition to a common issuance program. 
 
                                                 
1 See, e.g. Gros and Micossi (2009), Mayordomo et al. (2009), De Grauwe and Moesen  (2009), ELEC (2010), 
Jones (2010). 
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2.  STYLIZED FACTS 
In this section we provide the relevant stylized facts to assess the potential benefits from a 
European government bonds issued by euro-area Member States. First, we assess the 
degree of integration in the European government bond market by examining the behavior 
of interest rate differentials. Second, we examine the potential for a larger European 
market to better compete with the US market, by estimating the liquidity premium on 
German relative to US bonds. Finally, we look at the interest rate on bonds issued by the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) to evaluate the performance of a bond issued by an EU 
Institution. 
 
2.1. The Interest-Rate Spreads on German Bunds 
The European Monetary Union (EMU) brought to life an integrated market for fixed-income 
government securities in the euro-area. Common euro denomination made bonds issued by 
euro-area Member States close, but not perfect, substitutes. Figure 1 reports the yields to 
maturity on 10-year bonds issued by Germany and by high yield Member States: Portugal, 
Italy, and Spain. The Figure shows that 10-year yields converged significantly, narrowing 
from highs in excess of 300 basis points in the pre-EMU period to less than 30 basis points 
about one year after the introduction of the euro. Yet, bonds issued by euro-area Member 
States have never been regarded as perfect substitutes by market participants: non-
negligible interest rate differentials have remained and become sizeable during the course 
of 2008, 2009 and especially 2010. 
 
Figure 1: 
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There are two possible explanations for these interest rate differentials. The first 
one is credit risk; sovereign issuers that are perceived as having a greater solvency risk, 
must pay investors a credit risk premium. The second explanation is liquidity risk, that is, 
the risk of having to sell (or buy) a bond in a thin market and, thus, at an unfair price and 
with higher transaction costs. Small issuers with low volumes of bonds outstanding and 
thus small markets must compensate investors with a liquidity premium (see the BOX at 
the end of this section).  
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Distinguishing the credit risk premium from the liquidity premium is important because, 
while the former results from a low credit standing due to weak fiscal fundamentals, the 
latter reflects an inefficient national market. To solve this identification problem we use the 
Credit Default Swap (CDS) as a proxy of the credit risk premium. A CDS is a swap contract 
in which the protection buyer of the CDS makes a series of premium payments to the 
protection seller and, in exchange, receives a payoff if the bond goes into default. The 
difference between a CDS on a Member State bond and the CDS on the German Bund of 
the same maturity is a direct measure of the credit risk premium of that State relative to 
Germany. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 report interest-rate differentials for euro-area Member States (blue line) -
i.e. the spreads of 10-year government bond yields on German Bund yields– along with the 
associated CDS spreads (red line); their difference is a measure of the liquidity premium 
differential. We group the interest-rate spreads on Bunds and the associated CDS into high 
yielders (Figure 2) and low yielders (Figure 3).2  
 
The following facts emerge from the data:  
i) There is a clear tendency of all spreads on Bunds in the euro-area to comove (i.e. move 
in parallel) but, as shown in Figures 2-4, the nature of the comovement is not constant 
over time;  
ii) The liquidity premium component of the interest-rate spread is very small for all 
Member States with only few exceptions: Finland, France and, perhaps, the 
Netherlands;  
iii) The case of Finland where the credit risk premium is always close to zero, makes it clear 
that in a crisis the liquidity premium rises to determine a positive comovement between 
the Finnish spread and all other euro-area spreads.  
                                                 
2 We do not present data for Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and Slovakia because times series are not long enough given 
the short spell of time these countries have spent within the EMU. Data for Luxembourg are also not reported.   
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Figure 2: 
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Figure 3: 
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2.2.  Contagion 
There is an important fact about the comovements of interest-rate spreads in the euro 
area: their interdependence is not constant over time but it is subject to structural breaks, 
a phenomenon often referred to as “contagion”. To illustrate this phenomenon we consider 
two high-yielders, Greece and Italy, and one low-yielder, Finland. We report in Figure 4 the 
Greek, the Italian and the Finnish 10-year spreads on Bunds along with the spread between 
yields on US BAA and AAA corporate bonds, a variable often used to describe the market 
attitude toward risk. We consider the full sample 2003-2010 and three subsamples, the 
low-volatility period (2003-2007), the Financial Crisis (May 2007-August 2009) and the 
Greek Debt Crisis (September 2009-July 2010).  
 
Figure 4:  
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A changing correlation pattern clearly emerges from the data. Over the low-volatility period 
Italy and Greece are placed in the same class of risk by the market and their spreads on 
Bunds are very highly correlated. During the financial crisis the credit risk of the two high-
yielders diversify. In fact, both the Italian and the Greek spread positively react to the 
increase in the BAA-AAA spread but their response is different; the Greek spread reaches a 
peak of about 300 basis points, while the Italian spread peaks at 150. Interestingly, during 
the financial crisis also the Finnish spread on Bunds responds slightly to international risk 
because of an increase in the liquidity premium. Finally, during the Greek crisis, the surge 
in the interest rate on Greek bonds, not only leads the Greek spread to a value of nearly 
one-thousand basis points, but, strongly affects the Italian spread that even rises above 
the US BAA-AAA spread to reach almost 200 basis points. This evidence clearly points to a 
significant “contagion” effect.  
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2.3. The interest rate differential between German Bunds and US 
Treasuries 
The euro-area bond market is very close in size to the US market; Figure 5 shows that the 
difference in the volumes of bonds outstanding with a maturity longer than one year is 
negligible until the end of 2008. However, the German Bund market represents only 23% 
of the euro-area market and is thus much smaller than the US one. A natural question 
arises on the possibility that German Bunds have to pay a liquidity premium due to their 
smaller market size and the lack of international benchmark status enjoyed by US 
Treasuries.  
 
Figure 5: 
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Answering this question is made easier by the fact the CDS swap differential between US 
and Germany is negligible, and so is their relative credit risk premium, but is made more 
difficult by the existence of a fluctuating euro-dollar exchange rate. To filter out exchange-
rate expectations from the interest rate differential between German and US bonds, we use 
the difference between the 10-year Fixed Interest Rate Swaps in euro and in US dollars 
that is immune from sovereign liquidity and credit risks. We report in Figure 6 three series: 
the 10-year German US Asset Swap Spread (defined as the difference between the interest 
rate spread and the difference between the 10-year Fixed Interest Rate Swaps), the 
difference between the CDS on German Bunds and US Treasuries and the US BAA-AAA 
spread.  
 
We note first that before the financial crisis a common Eurobond would have enabled the 
euro-area market to better compete with the US market as the most liquid market globally. 
In the pre-crisis period the CDS differential is negligible and the asset swap spread can be 
taken as an indicator of the liquidity premium on German Bunds. It points to a sizeable 
liquidity premium, around a mean of 40 basis points. 
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Figure 6:  
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
GER-US 10-Y Asset Swap Spread (left) GER-US 10 Y CDS Spread (left) US BAA-AAA Spread (right)
Germany vs US
 
 
However, when the crisis hits the markets and the BAA-AAA spread starts fluctuating away 
from its low-risk period mean, the liquidity premium paid by German Bunds on US 
Treasuries disappears, and in fact is reversed as a consequence of the “flight to quality” 
towards German Bunds and a perceived higher relative credit risk of the US, as witnessed 
by the CDS differential. The increase in the relative supply of US Treasuries, shown in 
Figure 5, is also consistent with this interpretation. This pattern persists during the Greek 
debt crisis, probably due to a portfolio shifts towards German Bunds away from bonds 
issued by Member States with lower credit standings. Hence, in the pre-crisis period US 
Treasuries did enjoy the status of the most liquid benchmark globally, but they appear to 
lose this role thereafter.3  
 
                                                 
3 While it would worth looking at traded volumes to better understand the apparent reversal in international 
benchmark status, data are difficult to find because US Treasuries and German Bunds are mostly traded over the 
counter (Bunds as well as other euro-area bonds are also traded on regulated markets). 
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2.4. The interest rate on Eurobonds issued by the EIB 
To assess the performance of a bond issued by an EU Institution we construct, from various 
EIB bond issues, the interest rate on a synthetic EIB bond with residual term to maturity as 
close as possible to 10 years. Figure 7 reports the yields on 10-year EIB bonds along with 
the yields on 10-year German Bunds and the yields on 10-year Finnish bonds. We note first 
that the yield differential between the EIB bonds and German Bonds climbed from near 
zero to 100 basis points over the course of the financial crisis, to return to a level of around 
30 basis points thereafter.  
 
Although the pre-crisis level has not been restored yet, the impact of the euro-area debt 
crisis on this differential is clearly much smaller than that of the financial crisis. 
Interestingly, Figure 7 also shows that the interest rate on EIB bonds follows closely that on 
10-year Finnish bonds, paying only a small premium over it. As Finnish bonds have no 
credit risk but very low liquidity, this evidence suggests that the illiquidity of EIB bond is 
the most likely explanation for their interest rate differential with German Bunds. This 
evidence is consistent with the idea that a common Eurobond issued by a EU Institution 
would have the same credit quality of German Bunds. 
 
Figure 7:  
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BOX:  Credit Risk, Liquidity Risk and Interest Rate Differentials  
The interest rates on government bonds with the same currency denomination and maturity 
can differ because of different credit and liquidity risks. The credit risk depends on the 
creditworthiness of the issuer; if there is a positive, even small, probability that a 
government may not honor its obligations and default on its debt, investors will ask for a 
credit risk premium (or a default risk premium) to hold its bonds. As the probability of 
default that investors perceive increases, so does the credit risk premium and the interest 
rate. The credit premium depends on the government’s domestic fiscal fundamentals (deficit 
and debt) and economic growth, but also on international factors, such as the investors’ 
attitude to (or perception of) global risk, flight to quality effects and the level of interest 
rates. The liquidity of a bond depends on how easily it can be traded without incurring into 
losses and transaction costs. In a thick market with large volumes traded, the risk that 
selling (or buying) a bond may move the price adversely is reduced because the probability 
of a matching order increases. A thick and efficient market also reduces transaction costs. It 
follows that the liquidity premium (and the interest rate) that investors ask to hold a bond 
should decrease with the volume traded and thus with the stock of bonds outstanding; 
governments with smaller economies and lower amounts of bonds should pay a higher 
liquidity premium. Liquidity is also enhanced by the availability of a futures contract to hedge 
investors’ positions; German Bunds may pay a lower liquidity premium because they are the 
bonds on which the Eurex futures contract is based.  
 
This discussion suggests the following simple representation for the interest rate differential: 
 
      RM – RB = ΔC(d, g) + ΔL(v, g) 
 
where the difference between the interest rate on a Member State bond,  RM, and the 
interest rate on a benchmark bond, RB, i.e. the German Bund, is equal to the sum of the 
credit risk premium differential, ΔC, and the liquidity premium differential, ΔL. As discussed 
above, the credit risk premium depends on the domestic fundamentals, d, and global factors, 
g. The liquidity premium depends on the volumes of bonds outstanding, v, and on global 
factors. One reason for including global factors as determinants of the liquidity premium 
differential is that a perceived higher global risk is often associated with higher interest-rate 
volatility and thus an increased cost of illiquidity; i.e. of having to trade in a thin market at 
an uncertain price. Moreover, portfolio shifts by international investors towards safety and 
liquidity, i.e. flights to quality, may affect both the credit risk premium and the liquidity 
premium. We take the difference in credit default swaps (CDS) as a proxy of the credit risk 
premium differential, ΔC, and report in Figures 2 and 3 the spreads on Bunds, RM – RB (blue 
line),  and the CDS spread (red line); their difference is a measure of the liquidity premium 
differential, ΔL. 
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3.  WHAT TYPE OF EUROBOND? 
Several arguments have been put forth in favor of a common European government bond. 
All proposals stress that Eurobonds would promote further market integration, greater 
liquidity and lower borrowing costs due to a reduction in liquidity premia. Recent proposals 
also contend that Eurobonds could reach the status of a “safe-haven” benchmarks 
competing with US Treasuries for global financial flows and strengthen the use of the euro 
as an international reserve currency. The politically sensitive argument that Eurobonds 
could provide insurance and continued market access to weaker Member States is instead 
rarely made, but Eurobonds could reduce exposure to crisis transmission from contagion 
and interdependence. Whether some or all of these potential benefits would arise from 
common issuance depends on the type of debt instrument. It is then worth considering 
three hypotheses:   
 
3.1. A commonly issued Eurobond with country-specific shares 
backed by several guarantees 
The first hypothesis is a single debt instrument issued by a group of euro-area Member 
States, through an independent agency, with funds raised and obligations divided between 
participating issuers in specific fixed proportions (how to determine these shares is 
discussed below). Each participating Member State would guarantee only its share of the 
joint instrument. While the Eurobond would trade as a single debt instrument, each 
participant would be liable only for the interest payments and principal redemption 
corresponding to its share of the bond, and not for the debt of the other issuers. The credit 
standing of this bond would likely emerge and be perceived by investors as the average of 
the credit standings of the participating Member States (weighted by their relative shares), 
while its liquidity could be greater than that of the national bonds of the participating 
issuers depending on the size that its market would reach.4 
 
3.2.  A commonly issued Eurobond backed by joint guarantees 
The second hypothesis is a single debt instrument issued by a group of euro-area Member 
States backed by several and joint guarantees: each participating issuer would guarantee 
the totality of the obligations of the common instrument, thereby making it an indivisible 
legal object. The issuing entity could be an independent agency or, as suggested by 
Boonstra (2010), a newly created EMU Fund for on-lending to a group of participating euro-
area Member States. The debt-service obligations of each participating issuer would be 
specified in relation to the amount of funding obtained, but the cross-default nature of the 
joint guarantees would give an investor legal recourse to all the participating issuers, in 
case that not all the obligations of any issuer were fully met. Thus, the credit standing of 
this instrument would tend to reflect the creditworthiness of the participating Member 
States with larger economies. Participation by Germany and France would ensure a lower 
credit risk premium than the weighted average of the participating Member States even if 
some of them were of lower credit standings.5  
 
                                                 
4 This type of instrument has been studied by EPDA (2008) and is consistent with the proposal by De Grauwe and 
Moesen (2009). 
5 This type of instrument is the third hypothesis considered in the Giovannini Group Report (2000) and is 
consistent with the proposals by Boonstra (2010), Delpla (2010) and Jones (2010). 
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3.3. An EU Eurobond issued by an EU Institution 
The third hypothesis is a debt instrument issued by an EU Institution for on-lending to 
Member States. This institution would lend the funds raised with EU bonds to Member 
States at an interest rate reflecting funding costs plus, eventually, a margin possibly 
different across States. EU bonds would be backed by the several and joint guarantees of 
the 27 EU Member States; these guarantees would not be explicit but derive from the EU 
legal order. If the common bond were issued by the European Commission (EC) the 
guarantees would derive from the legal obligations of the Member States under the EU 
Treaty.6   If the bonds were issued by the EIB, it would be backed by the capital subscribed 
by EU Member States.7   In both cases, EU bonds would be of the highest credit quality and 
their risk premium should be close to zero.8  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Main Characteristics of the three Types of Eurobond 
Characteristic Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Issuing Entity Independent Agency 
Independent Agency 
or EMU Fund 
EU Institution 
EC or EIB 
Participation Open Open 
27 EU Member 
States  
Fixed Shares for each 
Country 
Yes 
No 
but limits on debt of 
each participant  
No 
but limits on debt of 
each EU Member 
Guarantees Several 
Several and Joint 
explicit 
Several and Joint 
from EU Treaty 
Mutualisation  
of Default Risk 
No Yes Yes 
Credit Rating 
Weighted Average 
of participants 
Reflect Rating of 
larger participants. 
Highest (AAA)  
if all euro-area 
Members join  
Highest (AAA) 
Liquidity 
Conditional on 
Market Size and 
Participation 
Conditional on 
Market Size and 
Participation 
Conditional on 
Market Size  
Management Inflexible Flexible Flexible 
Legal Obstacles None 
Change in TFEU 
Art.125 No-Bailout 
Change in TFEU 
 
                                                 
6 The European Commission already borrows on capital markets to fund its Balance of Payments Facility and its 
bonds have a AAA rating.  
7 The EIB already borrows on capital markets to finance investment projects and its bonds have a AAA rating. 
8 This type of instrument is the fourth proposal in the Giovannini Group Report (2000). Issuance of a common 
bond by the EIB has been considered by Majocchi (2005) for funding projects envisaged in the Lisbon Strategy 
and by Gros and Micossi (2009) for the purpose of financing a European Financial Stability Fund.  
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4.  THE ARGUMENTS FOR A COMMON EUROBOND  
 
4.1. The efficiency gains from further integration; greater liquidity 
and lower borrowing costs 
The main argument for a common European government bond is that it would promote 
further market integration, especially on the supply side, and greater debt management 
coordination. The efficiency gains from a unified bond market could be substantial: liquidity 
could be enhanced by larger outstanding volumes and the more so if the common 
Eurobond would become eligible for delivery into a futures contract. Greater liquidity would, 
in turn, reduce liquidity premia and, thus, the costs of borrowing for Member States, with 
greatest advantage for smaller and medium sized issuers. Finally, to the extent that 
issuance of national bonds would come to an end, some Member States with smaller 
funding needs would save the costs of maintaining their national primary markets and 
dealer systems.  
 
These benefits could be obtained, in various degrees, with all the three types of debt 
instruments   considered, to the extent that: issues were sufficiently large and regular; the 
outstanding volumes of the Eurobond reached sufficiently high levels and; its market 
replaced the national markets of, at least, the Member States with smaller funding needs.  
 
The evidence in section 2 suggests that the argument has some merit and mostly appeals 
to small issuers with high credit standings, such as Finland and The Netherlands, but also 
to a benchmark issuer like France, which all appear to have borne a high cost from 
illiquidity since the start of EMU.9  Interestingly, this cost increased over the course of the 
US financial crisis by up to 30 basis points, either because of greater interest-rate volatility 
or a portfolio shift toward German Bunds. In fact, liquidity premia for these countries seem 
to respond to the surge in measures of risk, thereby displaying a positive correlation with 
credit risk premia. Indeed, the higher interest-rate volatility, associated with a perceived 
higher risk, could increase the cost of illiquidity; i.e. of having to trade in a thin market at 
an uncertain price. Moreover, a portfolio shift by international investors towards safety and 
liquidity, i.e. a flight to quality, may affect both the credit risk premium and the liquidity 
premium.  
 
4.2.  A “safe-haven” alternative to US Treasuries and the use of 
the euro as a reserve currency 
Recent proposals contend that a common European government bond would satisfy the 
global demand for a risk-free asset and better compete with US Treasuries for the global 
financial flows in search of a safe investment. The “safe haven” argument is based on the 
idea that, since safe German Bunds are in scarce supply, a common Eurobond with similar 
credit risk characteristics, but greater liquidity, would attract the demand by international 
investors and thus would reduce the borrowing costs for the euro-area sovereign issuers. A 
single debt instrument would also strengthen the use of the euro as international reserve 
currency.  
 
Indeed, even German Bunds appear to suffer from a lack of liquidity or international 
benchmark status compared to US Treasuries: before the financial crisis, they have been 
paying a premium as high as 40 basis points, though their credit risk is practically zero.  
                                                 
9 For France this argument applies only to 10-year bonds. 
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This suggests that, even benchmark issuers, such as Germany and France, for which the 
gains from further integration have always been thought to be small, could benefit from 
greater liquidity if the common issuance market approached the size of the US market. 
Liquidity is, however, not enough; for a common Eurobond to achieve the status of a “safe 
haven” international benchmark, its credit standing should be as high as that of German 
Bunds. Indeed, evidence from the global financial crisis is consistent with a flight to credit 
quality more than liquidity. As shown in Section 2, the widening of interest-rate spreads on 
the bonds with lower credit standings is completely explained by their higher credit risk as 
measured by CDS spreads. Higher liquidity premia, or portfolio shifts towards German 
Bunds, can account for an increase in bond spreads only in a few Member States: Finland, 
France and The Netherlands. However, even the French spread during the euro-area debt 
crisis is mainly explained by an increase in credit risk as measured by the CDS spread. 
 
Whether the demand for a “safe haven” asset of high credit quality and liquidity can be 
satisfied by a common Eurobond depends on the type of the guarantees and/or the credit 
standings of the participating Member States. Participation to a Eurobond that makes each 
issuer liable only for its own share (as under hypothesis 1) would have to be restricted to 
Member States with a credit standing as high as that of Germany and France, since it would 
be equivalent to a diversified portfolio of national bonds. The latter countries should also 
join for such a bond to reach a sufficient liquidity. Whether participation to a Eurobond 
backed by joint guarantees (hypothesis 2) had to be equally restricted is an open question. 
Evidence on the credit quality of EIB bonds (which are implicitly backed by the joint 
guarantees of all EU Member States) can however shed light on this issue. As shown in 
section 2, EIB bonds are priced by international investors in the same way as safe but 
illiquid Finnish bonds; indeed the interest rate differential between the two bonds is 
practically zero. This suggests that a Eurobond issued by an EU Institution (and probably by 
all euro-area Member States) would be perceives as of the highest credit quality and could 
reach the “safe haven” status if its market size approached that of US Treasuries.  
 
4.3. Risk insurance, market access and crisis prevention 
In principle, common European government bonds could provide insurance against credit 
risk and ensure continued market access during crises to sovereign issuers under distress. 
However, for this to be case, the common Eurobond should have to be backed by the joint 
and cross guarantees of the issuing Member States (hypothesis 2) or it should be issued by 
an EU Institution (hypothesis 3). The risk insurance argument is rarely made in the policy 
debate and in the economic literature. This probably reflects political considerations but 
also economic reasons. Indeed, evidence that movements in interest-rate spreads (a proxy 
for credit spreads) have a strong common component mainly driven by changes in 
international risk factors suggests a limited scope for insurance.  
 
Notwithstanding the lack of risk-diversification opportunities, a debt instrument guaranteed 
by France and Germany, that together account for 46% of the euro-area debt, would be of 
similar credit quality of their national bonds and thus greater than the weighted average of 
the credit standings of the participating Member States. Evidence on the EIB bond interest 
rate closely tracking that of Finnish bonds is consistent with this hypothesis. However, 
there would be no economic rationale for a common Eurobond if its better credit quality 
and lower risk premium emerged from the assumption of risk by larger and safer issuers 
rather than from risk sharing opportunities. What needs to be argued is that country-
specific shocks have negative spillovers to other Member States’ creditworthiness. In this 
case, a common debt backed by joint guarantees (or issued by an EU Institution) would 
reduce exposure to crisis transmission from contagion and interdependence. If the 
occurrence of a debt crisis in a Member State increases the probability of a crisis in other 
States and, thus, their credit risk premia, then providing insurance to the State with the 
weakest fundamentals would work as an insurance for all; it would benefit all participating 
Member States except, perhaps, the most virtuous one. This would be the case if a debt 
crisis originating in a Member State were likely to propagate to other  
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Member States through their financial links. One main channel of crisis transmission is 
through cross-border holdings of national bonds and increased vulnerability of the 
European banking system. Another channel works from a worsening of market sentiment 
and increased risk aversion. The euro-area debt crisis triggered by the fiscal problems of 
Greece is a case in point. As shown in section 2, the surge in the credit risk premium of 
Greece clearly affected the Italian interest-rate spread that even rose above the US BAA-
AAA corporate spread to reach nearly 200 basis points. Even the credit risk component of 
the French spread that was muted until then reached almost 40 basis points in the euro-
area debt crisis. 
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5.  THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A COMMON EUROBOND 
 
5.1. Creating a thick market is costly and requires a permanent 
and credible issuance program 
A main argument against a commonly issued bond is that the launch of a Eurobond would 
add a new market to the existing national markets and thus increase rather than reduce 
fragmentation. In fact, to promote market integration, enhance liquidity and provide a 
safe-haven international benchmark, the outstanding amount of Eurobonds should be 
substantial and, more importantly, Eurobonds should replace national bonds on a large 
scale. This implies that the success of the program will critically hinge on the decision of 
participating Member States to rely on the new instrument for their funding needs. Smaller 
size issuers, in particular, should quickly move to Eurobonds and close their national 
markets. Commitment to a permanent issuance program will then be crucial. To create a 
thick market, Eurobond issues would have to be sufficiently large, regular and predictable, 
i.e. based on an issuing calendar specifying minimum offered amounts. More importantly, 
issuance should not be discontinued.10   This may prove to be difficult to the extent that 
the transition process will involve high initial set-up costs and uncertain benefits in the 
ture. 
 
he management of 
ach Member State’s total debt and run against full market integration.  
 be 
efended on the basis that each Member States would remain liable for its own share.  
ot depend on the amount of funds that each Member State 
would obtain from that issue.  
                                                
fu
5.2. Centralized funding makes debt management inflexible 
The Eurobond issuing program would have to accommodate the different needs of 
participating issuers, from rolling-over maturing debt to achieving the desired maturity 
structure, to early redemptions. The problem is now less compelling than at the start of 
EMU because of the substantial convergence in the type of (medium- and long-term) 
instruments and in the maturity structure of public debt across Member States. Interest-
rate swaps can also be used to fine tuning the duration of the debt. It is however a fact 
that centralized funding would raise coordination issues and would reduce flexibility in the 
pursuit of country-specific debt management objectives that would have to be 
accommodated on national bond markets. This could add complexity to t
e
 
The “inflexibility” problem is different depending on the type of Eurobond. A debt 
instrument with country-specific shares backed by several but not joint guarantees 
(hypothesis 1) would prove to be the most inflexible. In order to enhance liquidity and 
facilitate the pricing of risk, subsequent bond issues would have to be comparable over 
time and this could only be ensured by keeping both the set of participating Member States 
and their shares in the common bond constant over time. A trade off would then emerge in 
the choice of these shares; they could either reflect the debt levels (or securities 
outstanding) of the participating issuers or the sizes of their economies in terms of GDP. 
The latter solution would restrict the use of the common instrument by the Member States 
with highest debt levels and might be instrumental to impose fiscal discipline, but the 
former would be preferable to promote market integration and liquidity and could
d
 
A Eurobond underpinned by joint guarantees (hypotheses 2 and 3) allows for a greater 
flexibility in accommodating debt management needs because the risk characteristics of 
each single bond issue would n
 
10 The use of Eurobonds for temporary programs, such as the funding of the European Financial Stability Fund as 
proposed by Gros and Micossi (2009), would thus fail to reduce market fragmentation and enhance liquidity. 
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However, limits on the maximum amount of debt that each participating Member State 
could possibly incur over time (and across maturities) would have to be agreed upon and 
communicated before the start of the program. Because of the assumption of risk by all 
participating issuers, these limits would have to be set in relation to their taxing power and 
thus GDPs. Moreover, in order to preserve the comparability of different issues over time, 
the Member States participating in the program should not change. 
 
Issuance of Eurobonds by an EU Institution can also ensure flexibility in that the Institution 
could deal with specific needs in lending to Member States. Even in this case a limit should 
be set to the maximum amount of debt that each State could possibly incur over time (and 
across maturities). Constant participation would also be a problem (on top of participation 
tout court) to the extent that new states joined the EU. 
 
In all cases, joint issuance would require a high degree of coordination: amounts, maturity 
and timing of bond issues would have to be decided by the issuing entity in close co-
operation with the Member States. 
 
5.3. Lower incentives for fiscal discipline and moral hazard 
The most forceful argument against a common European bond is that it undermines fiscal 
discipline by removing incentives for sound budgetary policies. At worst, it could create a 
moral hazard problem in that a Member State may be tempted to free ride on other 
Members’ legal obligations to assume its debt in case of default. In particular, a common 
Eurobond prevents financial markets from exerting their disciplinary effects through higher 
interest rates and undermines the no bailout clause that prohibits a Member State to be 
liable for or assume the debt obligations of another government. Then, with lower costs of 
default and deficit financing, Member States would be encouraged to run lax fiscal policies 
and take up more debt. This would weaken the credibility of the euro-zone as an area of 
stability and fiscal soundness.11  
 
A first argument that applies to all types of Eurobonds is that they will reduce the credit 
risk premium and thus the interest rate that weaker Member States have to pay on their 
debts. However, the case for relying on the disciplinary effects of widening interest rate 
spreads is weak. Experience shows that market signals, i.e. interest rate spreads, not only 
are dominated by swings in market sentiment but, more importantly, can remain weak for 
a long time and change violently when it is too late to prompt fiscal adjustment.  
 
A stronger case can instead be made against Eurobonds with mutual guarantees based on 
the fact that the cross-default nature of the guarantees would undermine the no bailout 
clause (Article 125 TFEU), and heighten the risk of moral hazard. However, to assess the 
impact of Eurobonds on fiscal discipline one has to ask how effective the no bailout clause 
is in preventing irresponsible or even opportunistic behavior. In fact, there has always been 
skepticism as to whether governments would adhere to the no bailout clause given the 
close financial and economic ties within the euro-area and the threat of contagion. After the 
rescue of Greece, these doubts have been reinforced and the deterrent role of the no 
bailout clause has lost much of its credibility.12  Summing up, bailout expectations and 
moral hazard will always be a problem. It has to be seen whether it would be wise to 
further weaken the no bailout principle. For instance, with a jointly guaranteed debt the 
possibility of imposing strict conditionality on financial support to a country with fiscal 
distress would partly be lost.  
 
                                                 
11 See Issing (2009) for a stand against Eurobonds, Becker (2010) and Berrigan (2010) for a discussion. 
12 The debate on strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact offers further evidence that fiscal discipline cannot 
rely on the no bailout clause. 
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In the end the problem of moral hazard created by the mutualisation of risks would always 
emerge, as it is inherent in any insurance contract. The important question to ask is 
whether a common Eurobond can reduce exposure to crisis transmission and whether this 
benefit can compensate for the risk of moral hazard. Moreover, bailout and moral hazard 
problems can be limited, for instance by fixing the maximum amount of debt obligations 
that each Member State could have in the form of Eurobonds (see Depla 2010 and Jones 
2010).13 Any borrowing need beyond this ceiling would have to be funded with national 
bonds. This would set a limit to the obligations that the other Member States would have to 
guarantee and be liable for in the event that a Member State would default. Moreover, 
Eurobonds could be made senior with respect to the national bonds issued after the start of 
the program (see Depla 2010). While Eurobonds would be risk free, any debt exceeding the 
ceiling would have to be issued at higher interest rates on the national market. This 
solution is simple and set incentives for fiscal discipline that are closely related to the 
amount of outstanding debt, a feature that is still missing in the Stability and Growth Pact.  
 
                                                 
13 EPDA (2008) also concludes that debt limits should be preferred to the creation of a Guarantee Fund given 
market aversion to structured products.    
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6.  FEASIBILITY 
Is the issuance of a Eurobond feasible?  Debt underpinned by joint guarantees is not only 
against the spirit but most likely violates the no bailout clause of the EU Treaty. A common 
Eurobond also faces strong political opposition. These issues are addressed in what follows. 
 
6.1. Legal obstacles  
Legal obstacles depend on the nature of the guarantees underpinning the common 
Eurobond. A debt instrument that makes each participating Member State liable only for its 
own share (hypothesis 1) would not face legal impediments. Common issuance could be 
agreed outside the EU legal framework; participating issuers would only be required to 
abide by common rules on technical issues.  
 
More advanced arrangements implying the cross-guarantees of the participating Member 
States may require changes in the legal infrastructure, either in the Treaty, or in EU 
legislation. For instance, a common Eurobond backed by the several and joint guarantees 
of the participating euro-area Member States (hypothesis 2) violates the no bailout clause, 
i.e. the letter of Art 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
 
Legal obstacles related to the possible violation of the no bailout clause would be 
technically different in the case of a bond issued by an EU Institution because the cross 
guarantees, would not be explicit but derive from the EU legal order. On the other hand, 
providing the European Commission with the power to raise funds for deficit financing 
would likely require a change in the Treaty, unless it could be based upon Article 352 TFEU 
(conferring the Council the power to adopt actions necessary for the attainment of the 
Treaties’ objectives), as the Balance of Payment Facility under regulation 302/2002. A 
possible alternative to be explored could be to give the Commission power to raise funds 
under Article 122.2 TFEU, whose scope is restricted to financial assistance by the Council in 
case, inter alia, of difficulties caused by exceptional circumstances, as for the European 
financial stabilization mechanism recently adopted on May 9, 2010. A similar problem arises 
if the mandate of EIB were to be extended to finance the deficit of the Member States, as 
Article 309 TFEU should be modified. 
 
Finally, and importantly, if an EU Institution, such as the EC or the EIB, were to become the 
single issuer, the question of non-participating Member States which would de facto cross 
guarantee the debt of the participating States would have to be addressed (see 
Goldschmidt 2009). 
 
6.2. Political Feasibility 
Political opposition has two motivations. The first is that a common Eurobond relaxes fiscal 
discipline and creates a moral hazard problem, as already discussed in the previous section. 
The second, perhaps, more compelling issue is the equitable sharing of the benefits and 
costs of the program. While all Member States participating in the issuance of a Eurobond 
(or borrowing from an EU Institution) would benefit from greater liquidity, those with the 
highest credit standings might lose from the mutualisation of credit risk. If the joint bond 
did not reach the safe-haven status, Member States with sound budgetary polices and low 
debts could even face higher credit risk premia and borrowing costs. In any case, they 
would end up subsidizing Member States with weaker fiscal fundamentals.14 
 
                                                 
14 See Berrigan (2010) for a further discussion. 
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In the case each participating Member States were liable only for its own share of the joint 
instrument (hypothesis 1), the latter would be equivalent to a diversified portfolio of 
national bonds and the credit risk component of its interest rate would likely emerge as an 
average of the credit risk premia paid by participating issuers on their national bonds. The 
risk characteristics of a common Eurobond backed by joint guarantees (hypothesis 2) would 
depend on the participating Member States. In the best case scenario, the credit quality 
and the risk premium of a Eurobond jointly  guaranteed by all euro-area Member States 
would be as good as those of French and German national bonds. But the latter States, 
while sharing the benefits of enhanced safe-haven status and, perhaps, greater euro-zone 
financial stability, by assuming the credit risk of the other States, would see their risk 
exposure increased. Issuance by an EU Institution would also be problematic and even 
more so because EU Member States outside the euro-area would guarantee the Eurobond 
without sharing its benefits.  
 
As the discussion makes clear, the lack of participation incentives is a serious obstacle to 
the implementation of any common issuance program. Why should a Member State pay a 
higher interest rate or agree to guarantee the debt of other States if it did not obtain a 
proportionate share of the benefits?  This explains why Eurobond proposals usually come 
along with suggestions on how to relax the participation constraint. 
 
A first solution is to restrict participation to the Member States with the highest credit 
rating or to restrict issuance to a short-maturity low-risk type of instrument: Treasury bills 
(see EFDA 2008, Münchau 2009). These solutions cannot be applied to a Eurobond issued 
by an EU Institution, limit the scope of market integration and may not be effective 
because, as shown in section 2, the credit risk component of interest rate spreads may 
differ substantially even within the same class of high rated bonds.  
 
A second solution relies on a compensation scheme based on the indexation of the interests 
paid by each Member State either to measures of its credit risk premium or to fiscal 
parameters. For instance, each Member State could pay on its share of the Eurobond a 
margin equal to the credit risk premium, as measured by CDS, on its national bonds, while 
the remaining interest payments would be proportional to the share of the Eurobond (see 
Mayordomo et al. 2009).15  This scheme could be applied to any type of Eurobond. For 
instance, an EU Institution could charge Member States with different interest rates. The 
main problem with this solution is that, for the compensation scheme to work, the markets 
for national bonds (on which CDS are quoted) have to be kept alive contrary to the 
objective of reducing fragmentation. Making Eurobonds depend on the national markets 
that they should replace is a self-defeating strategy.16  If anything, Member States with 
smaller funding needs would not be able to issue Eurobonds and at the same time maintain 
a liquid market for their national bonds. A different compensation scheme, that overcomes 
these difficulties, is to index the interest payments to fiscal parameters such as the deficit 
and/or the public (and private) debt relative to GDP (see Boonstra 2010 and Gros 2010). 
This solution offers a shield from the sudden swings in sentiment on financial markets, and 
may provide incentives for fiscal discipline based on EU most preferred indicators of fiscal 
sustainability but agreement on technical details on the indexation mechanism could be 
difficult to reach. 
 
The only viable solution, as already discussed in the previous section, is to define the 
maximum amount of debt obligations that each Member State could have in the form of 
Eurobonds. Any additional borrowing would have to be funded with national bonds. This 
would set a limit to the obligations that the participating Member States would have to 
guarantee and be liable for in the event that one of them would default.  
                                                 
15 Similarly, De Grauwe and Moesen (2009) propose to link payments to the interest rates on national bonds. 
Interest rates are however worse proxies for credit risk than CDS spreads.  
16 Furthermore, if a common Eurobond backed by joint guarantees reduced the exposure to crisis transmission 
then the risk premium measured by CDS on national bonds would tend to overstate the credit-risk contribution of 
the participating issuers.  
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If Eurobonds were also made senior with respect to the national bonds issued after the 
start of the program, they would be risk free (see Delpla 2010). This solution would ensure 
a safe-haven status for Eurobonds, set incentives for fiscal discipline and appears equitable 
to Member States with strongest fiscal fundamentals. Whether it could receive political 
support is however unlikely. 
 
 
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we have provided the relevant stylized facts to assess the potential benefits 
from a European government bond issued by euro-area Member States or by an EU 
Institution. We have found that credit risk premia are the main drivers of interest-rate 
differentials of euro-area Member States relative to Germany, a fact suggesting little scope 
for a Eurobond with country-specific shares that leaves each participating issuer liable only 
for its own share. Indeed, only few Member States, Finland, France and, perhaps, the 
Netherlands appear to have borne a high cost from illiquidity. Moreover, the efficiency gains 
from a Eurobond backed by several but not joint guarantees in terms of market integration 
and greater liquidity would be limited and possibly offset by the higher costs of an inflexible 
debt management.  
 
The potential benefits of combining credit quality with liquidity are suggested by the 
evidence on the interest-rate differential between German and US bonds. Indeed, we find 
empirical support to the “safe haven” argument that a common Eurobond with the same 
credit standing of German Bunds, but greater liquidity, would attract the demand by 
international investors and strengthen the use of the euro as a reserve currency. In fact, 
before the US financial crisis, German Bunds appear to suffer from a lack of liquidity or 
international benchmark status compared to US Treasuries. After the crisis they even 
appear to be perceived as a safer investment. This findings together with the evidence of a 
zero credit risk premium on EIB bonds suggests that a Eurobond issued by all euro-area 
Member States could reap the liquidity benefits of a unified market approaching in size that 
of US Treasuries. However, to reach a “safe-haven” status the common bond would have to 
be jointly guaranteed by all euro-area Member States. A Eurobond backed by joint 
guarantees could also reduce exposure to crisis transmission and contagion that appear 
relevant factors affecting interest-rate spreads over the course of the euro-area debt crisis.  
 
A Eurobond issued by an EU institution would also provide these benefits but participation 
of non-euro Member States would be problematic as they would assume the risk of a jointly 
guaranteed debt without fully sharing its benefits. This suggests the creation of a new EMU 
issuing entity for centralized funding of euro-area Member States. Full participation by 
euro-area Member States should also be ensured since the start of the program; a gradual 
approach with sequential participation is bound to fail because a common issuance program 
has high initial set-up costs while its success critically hinges on the potential market size 
for the new instrument and thus on the number of participating issuers and their credible 
commitment to the program.  
 
Issuance of a jointly guaranteed Eurobond requires, however, a change in the no bailout 
clause (Article 125 TFEU) and, more importantly, the political will to implement it, which is 
lacking at present. Indeed, a mutualisation of credit risk faces strong political opposition 
especially by Member States with sound fiscal fundamentals because of fears of relaxed 
fiscal discipline and inequitable sharing of the benefits and the costs from the program. 
Although solutions to these problems can be found, it is difficult to think of a Member State 
willing to assume another State’s risk in the absence of an EU common fiscal policy. 
Indeed, one may even wonder whether a common debt will ever exist without a stronger 
fiscal integration.  
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